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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee,

Case No.

900289

v.
RAYMOND PHILLIP CABUTUTAN
Priority No. 2
Petitioner/Appellant.
APPELLEE'S ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT DID NOT OVERLOOK OR MISAPPREHEND
ANY POINT OF LAW OR FACT RAISED BY PETITIONER
IN HIS OPENING BRIEF. FURTHERMORE, POINTS
NOW RAISED BY PETITIONER ARE NOT AMENABLE TO
CONSIDERATION ON REHEARING; RATHER, THEY ARE
MORE PROPERLY ADDRESSED IN A PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
Introduction
In his opening brief petitioner's counsel asserted
trial court errors which, he claimed, adversely affected his
representation (Appellant's Br. at Petitioner seeks in this
petition to resurrect claims made by his former defense counsel
on appeal, there solicitously characterized as instances of
ineffective assistance of counsel at trial but which this Court
correctly recognized as genuine assertions of trial error
A.

This Court did not Misapprehend
or Overlook Anything in Reviewing
Petitioner's Appeal.
Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides

that in support of a petition for rehearing the petitioner must
identify "the points of law or fact which the petitioner claims

the court has overlooked or misapprehended . . . ." Utah R. App.
P. 35(a).

Cummings v. Neilson, 42 Utah 157, 172-73, 129 P.619

(1913) .

1. Petitioner's
Appellate
Counsel
was Plainly Asserting Trial Court
Error as Opposed to
Ineffective
Assistance
of Counsel.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.
2052 (1984), the United States Supreme Court set out the standard
to be applied in reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's
performance was deficient. This requires showing
that counsel was not functioning as the "counsel"
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense.
This requires showing that counsel's errors were
so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
Id. at 2064-68 (emphasis added).
Petitioner was represented at trial by Quinn Hunsaker,
who also represented petitioner on appeal. As petitioner
correctly points out, this arrangement poses inherent
difficulties for counsel who seeks to argue on appeal his own
ineffectiveness at trial.

See Dunn v. Cook. 791 P.2d 873, 876

(Utah 1990) (stating, in dicta, that counsel on appeal could not
effectively challenge his own trial performance).

However, this

is not such a case.
Mr. Hunsaker identified five areas at trial in which he
facially asserted that he did not function as effective counsel
(Appellant's Br. at 19, 39-43).

However, it is apparent from
2

petitioner's opening brief, as it is from this Court's decision,
State v. Cabututan, 213 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah 1993) (attached
at Addendum A), that Mr. Hunsaker was not arguing his own
ineffectiveness, but rather trial court error.
Particularly, Mr. Hunsaker alleged that he was unable
to:

(1) adequately cross-examine witness; (2) object to the jury

panel or insure that minorities were on the panel; (3) determine
whether to sever from or join with co-defendants at trial; (4)
investigate alcohol/intent claims by a psychiatrist; or (5)
adequately prepare the self-defense argument (Appellant's Br. at
43) -1
However, with respect to each of these claims,
petitioner specifically and vigorously argued that it trial court
error that led to these alleged shortcomings.

Thus, petitioner's

alleged failure to adequately cross examine witnesses was
substantively argued as a function of the trial court's refusal
to provide petitioner with an investigator (Appellant's Br. at
23-24) . Petitioner argued the same ground with respect to his
alleged failure to prepare a self-defense argument (Appellant's
Br. at 22, 25). Petitioner directed a separate section of his
brief to the argument that he had been deprived of the
opportunity to investigate alcohol/intent claims, arguing state
and federal constitutional violations and Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-

1

This itemization of alleged ineffectiveness consists of
the same items which petitioner claims Mr. Hunsaker could not
have effectively argued in petitioner's motion for new trial
(Petition at 9-10).
3

1 (1990), all supported with citation to legal authority
(Appellant's Br. at 24-28).

All of these claims, including the

determination of whether to proceed with separate or joint
trials, were explicitly stated as a function of the limited time
within which petitioner claimed he had been constrained to
prepare (Appellant's Br. at 42).

However, petitioner's challenge

to the trial court's refusal to grant him a continuance was the
primary argument advanced by petitioner on appeal, embracing all
others (Appellant's Br. at 19-28).
At no point did Mr. Hunsaker truly acknowledge that he
believed he had functioned incompetently.

Furthermore, this

Court determined there was no trial court error with respect to
each of the substantive grounds purportedly forming the basis of
Mr. Hunsaker's alleged ineffectiveness.

Compare Cabututan, 213

P.2d at 19-21 (holding defense counsel, appointed two and onehalf months before trial, had sufficient time and access to an
investigator to prepare), with Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937, 94243 (5th Cir. 1967) (failure to grant motion to continue, thus
restricting time available to counsel to develop defense relying
on psychiatric evaluation, rendered counsel ineffective).

In

sum, this Court should not in a petition for rehearing revisit
arguments that have already been substantively addressed.

People

v. Tidwell, 5 Utah 88, 12 P. 638 (Utah 1886); Brown v. Pickard, 4
Utah 292, 9 P. 573 (Utah 1886).
Only with respect to petitioner's claim that he failed
to object to the jury panel or insure that minorities were
4

included on the panel did Mr. Hunsaker choose not to argue
substantively.

As the State pointed out, Mr. Hunsaker obviously

concluded that the claims of racial bias upon which the argument
was based were without merit (Appellee's Brief at 32-33).

This

assertion is buttressed by petitioner's having made this claim
the basis of his argument under Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967) (Appellant's Br. at 45-46).
Petitioner, however, is not concerned with any failure
to fully develop an Anders brief on a single issue.

Rather, his

discussion recites a series of alleged omissions, argued by the
State in its opening brief, which suggest to petitioner that Mr.
Hunsaker's appellate brief was intended entirely as an Anders
brief (Petition at 11-12).

As argued above, and as also pointed

out by the State (Appellee's Br. at 32-33), Mr. Hunsaker argued
vigorously a substantial number of issues, though not all of
which compelled counsel's serious attention.

It is apparent that

this Court recognized this, finding simply that claims of juror
bias were unsupported by legal authority.

2.

No Conflict of Interest
is
Shown to Have Affected
Trial
Counsel's
Representation.

In support of his claim that Mr. Hunsaker was burdened
by a conflict of interest in his representation, petitioner cites
cases in which prejudice is latent because of the nature of a
conflict which is manifest in the representation.

See State v.

Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 488-90 (Utah App. 1991) (defense counsel
was implicated at trial as one of the defendant's
5

coconspirators); State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 857-58 (Utah 1992)
(part-time city prosecutor representing criminal defendant
constituted an inherent conflict of interest since counsel might
naturally refrain from vigorously cross-examining or attacking
police officers or opposing the constitutionality of a statute
prosecutor was sworn to uphold, in addition to possibly being
affected by unconscious impulses).
The burden of showing the existence of an actual
conflict of interest is the proponent of an ineffective
assistance claim.

State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 73 (Utah App.

1990) (applying test set out in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335,
348, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1718 (1980), when the defendant has not
raised in the trial court an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim based on a conflict of interest).
In this case the alleged conflict of interest is based
on Cabututan v. Hunsaker, No. 92-C-136 J (D.C. Utah 1992) (see
Addendum attached to Petition).

The complaint alleges claims

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 1985(3) and 1986.

The claims

urged are substantially those allegations comprising petitioner's
claims of ineffective assistance.2

The district court's

2

The Tenth Circuit glossed petitioner's claimed violations
of his constitutional rights:
"Among the appellants [sic] claims are that
the appellee failed to request a venue change
in light of pretrial publicity, request a new
jury after he was informed of prejudicial
remarks made by some jurors, impeach or
object to the testimony of contradictory
eyewitnesses, object to violations of the
exclusionary rule, keep out perjured
6

docketing sheet indicates that the complaint was filed on
February 12, 1992 (see Addendum attached to Petition), more than
six months after the case was argued before this Court on June
10, 1991. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the claims under sections
1981, 1985(3) and 1986, noting that "[n]one of these [racial]
references suggest that the appellee acted with any racial or
class-based discriminatory animus."
92-4086 at 3-4 n.6.

Cabututan v. Hunsaker, No.

Thus, the conflict petitioner refers to

amounts to nothing more than his claims of ineffective
assistance, which Mr. Hunsaker could not even have been aware of
until more than half a year after he effectively ceased any
active representation of petitioner.
Finally, petitioner's affidavit, in conjunction with
the trial court's acceptance of petitioner's request to represent
himself on appeal (see Affidavit of Raymond Phillip Cabututan and
Minute Entry of July 11, 1990, attached to Addendum to Petition),
only suggests a

disagreement between attorney and client at time

of the events referred to.

It is indisputable that after the

trial court accepted petitioner's request for self-representation
he acquiesced in Mr. Hunsaker's proceeding with the appeal.
testimony, move for a racially balanced jury,
or more for a new trial. In addition, the
appellant claim the appellee was "related
through marriage" to the state's [sic]
attorney, represented some of the jurors as a
private attorney, refuse to argue selfdefense as the appellant request and
incompetently directed his appeal.
Cabututan v. Hunsaker, No. 92-4086, slip op. at 2 n.2 (10th Cir.
March 1, 1993) .
7

There is nothing in the record to suggest that such acquiescence
was not entirely voluntary, the rational inference in this case.
In any event, this Court could not have "overlooked or
misapprehended" an alleged conflict of interest which was not
explicitly brought to its attention.
B.

Petitioner's Claims are Properly
Addressed Only in a Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus.
Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides:

"Where no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available, a
person may petition the court for extraordinary relief on any of
the grounds set forth in paragraph (b) (involving wrongful
imprisonment) . . . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a).

Because

rehearing and, as argued below, remand pursuant to rule 23B, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, do not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, petitioner should be directed to file a petition
for writ of habeas corpus under rule 65B.
Even if this Court should determine that the issue of
trial counsel's arguing his ineffectiveness on appeal was an
issue that was overlooked, that is not an issue which this Court
can resolve on a petition for rehearing.

Assuming, arguendo,

that trial counsel cannot argue his own ineffectiveness on
appeal, there is not a sufficient record upon which any
particulars of deficient performance or prejudice can be
determined under Strickland and State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1225 (Utah 1993) (citing Strickland for the standard in
evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
8

It is

apparent that petitioner's claims, i.e., that the jury was
racially prejudiced or that Mr. Hunsaker was unable to assess
whether or not to proceed jointly with co-defendants, cannot be
determined on the record presently before the Court.
This Court has echoed the above-stated principle that a
defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must
demonstrate actual prejudice flowing from the alleged error, and
not some conceivable adverse effect on the verdict.

Bundy v.

Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805-6 (Utah 1988); Codianna v. Morris, 660
P.2d 1101, 1107 (Utah 1983); State v. Lovell, 758 P.2d 909, 913
(Utah 1988); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986).
Further, this Court has made clear that an assessment of
ineffective assistance of counsel, whether for determining the
adequacy of the lawyer's performance or the existence of actual
prejudice, must be made within the context of the entire record.
Codianna, 660 P.2d at 1107; State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 187
(Utah 1990).
Petitioner in this case has merely made a suggestive
argument that his trial counsel was not in a position to
represent him on appeal, but has failed to place before this
Court a record upon which his claims could be assessed.

State v.

Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1985) ("The burden of showing
error is on the party who seeks to upset the judgment.") (quoting
State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982).
In Dunn v. Cook, this Court recognized the deficiency
of the defendant's Anders brief only after he had developed a
record in the district court following the denial of his petition

9

for writ of habeas corpus.

Dunn, 791 P.2d at 877.

Further evidence of the inadequacy of a petition for
rehearing to adequately address issues which can only be resolved
after further development of the record is recourse to rule 23B,
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

That rule provides for a

temporary remand to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to
determine prejudice arising out of a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel supported by affidavits showing the
attorney's deficient performance and the appellant's having
suffered prejudice.

Utah R. App. P. 23B.

However, the rule

limits the period in which it may be invoked:

"In no event shall

the court permit a motion to be filed after oral argument."
R. App. P. 23B(a).

Utah

Thus, only a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus, in which the necessary evidentiary record can be
developed, is available.
Furthermore, it would be both awkward for this Court
and unfair to the State to grant rehearing in this case.

In the

first instance, the Court's opinion in Cabututan would remain in
limbo while awaiting the development of a record (assuming this
Court were willing to suspend the filing requirements of rule
23B, pursuant to rule 2, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure).

In

the second instance, the State could not adequately respond
within the framework of a petition for rehearing on the merits of
petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr.
Hunsaker is dead, and therefore cannot assist the State in
explaining his trial conduct.

In order to defend the adequacy of
10

Mr. Hunsaker's representation, in addition to whatever record
support may exist, the State must necessarily obtain personal
records, memos and third-party conversations, if any exist.
is necessarily a time-consuming investigation.

This

Thus, for all

these reasons, this Court should decline to grant rehearing.
POINT II
PETITIONER MAY FULLY LITIGATE CLAIMS RELATED
TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL UPON A
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, IF THE
COURT FINDS PETITIONER HAS ESTABLISHED
"UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES."
Petitioner is generally correct in asserting that
claims once litigated cannot be relitigated.

In construing rule

65B(i) (2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,3 this Court stated in
Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989):
A ground for relief from a conviction or
sentence that has once been fully and fairly
adjudicated on appeal or in a prior habeas
proceeding should not be readjudicated unless
it can be shown that there are "unusual
circumstances."
In Dunn v. Cook, this Court recognized that in a proper case a
defendant could show "unusual circumstances" by demonstrating
that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel.
875-76.

Dunn at

Therefore, petitioner in this case is not foreclosed

from proceeding upon a petition for writ of habeas corpus if he
can indeed show that there existed unusual circumstances
amounting to a denial of constitutional rights.

3

In 1992, the rule was amended and substantially
reorganized. Equivalent provisions now appear at subsections
(b) (3) and (b) (7) .
11

POINT III
PETITIONER MAY NOT RAISE ISSUES OTHER THAN
THOSE MANDATED BY THIS COURT IN ITS REMAND
ORDER.
Petitioner apparently argues that he be permitted to
raise whatever issues he chooses upon remand of this case to the
trial court.

The argument is without merit.

In Cabututan, this Court reversed the trial court's
denial of petitioner's motion for a new trial and remanded the
case for a new hearing based on the availability of the
transcripts of co-defendants trials.
Rep. at 21-22.

Cabututan, 213 Utah Adv.

The remand was ordered for no other purpose and

should be appropriately restricted to the mandate of this Court
in so ruling.

See State v. Magouirk, 561 So.2d 801, 806-07 (La.

Ct. App. 1990) (remand for limited purpose of conducting
evidentiary hearing on one issue and defendant no entitled to
have motion to quash indictment based on alleged prosecutorial
misconduct heard prior to remand).

Further, defendant's request

is unsupported by any legal authority.

State v. Amicone, 689

P.2d 1341, 1344, (Utah 1984) ("Since the defendant fails to
support this argument by any legal analysis or authority, we
decline to rule on it,")
In sum, this Court's remand for a hearing based on the
use of transcripts of co-defendant's trials should be limited for
purpose of determining exculpatory testimony and the substance of
petitioner's claim of self-defense, as set forth in the Court's
remand order.

Cabututan, 213 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22.
12

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing reasons, the State
respectfully requests that this Court deny petitioner's petition
for a rehearing.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J__ day of November, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General.^

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Answer to Petition for Rehearing was mailed, postage
prepaid to A. W. Lauritzen, Attorney for Defendant, 610 North
Main, P.O. Box 171, Logan, Utah 84321, this /_
1993

day of November,

7

^A

13
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State v. Cabututan

UAPA "clearly indicates that absent a grant of
discretion, a correcuon-of-errorsundard is used
m reviewing an agency's interpretation or
application of a statutory term "5 However, we
further observed that where we might otherwise
grant an agency deference on the basis of its
expertise, "it is also appropriate to grant the
agency deference on the basis of an explicit or
implicit grant of discretion contained in the
governing statute."6 This case presents such a
circumstance.
The Commission correctly observed that it lies
within die authority, indeed, it is the duty and
obligation, of county boards of equalization to
adjust and equalize the valuation and assessment
of all property within the county.7 The
assessments made by the county assessor,* as
equalized by the county board of equalization
and the Commission, are the only basis for
property taxation by the county.9
The record adequately supports the
reasonableness of the Commission's conclusion
as to the insufficiency of the evidence offered by
both sides concerning the fair market value of
the property The record dispels any notion of
arbitrariness or capaciousness in the
Commission's exercise of its discretion to
remand for a further evidentiary hearing before
the Board. Also, s o prejudice results by reason
of the remand. On the contrary, it will afford
each party the opportunity to more adequately
present the needed evidence of fair market
value
In regard to the remaining contention that
further proceedings before the Board will be to
no avail, suffice it to say that the various county
assessors and boards of equalization throughout
the state cannot but be faced with similarly
difficult evaluation tasks, and no doubt, there
are many and varied means to accomplish their
mandated task, which is to determine fair market
value of all property within the state In any
event,the contention does not rise to the level of
a constitutional question.
We have duly considered petitioners'
remaining contentions and find diem to be
without ment We therefore affirm the orders of
the Commission.
WE CONCUR:
Richard C. Howe, Associate Chief Justice
I. Daniel Stewart, Justice
Christine M. Durham, Justice
Michael D. Zimmerman, Justice
1. Utah Code Ann |63-46b-16
2. 814? 2d 581 (Utah 1991)
3. Id at 585-87
4. Id x 584
5. Id 1588
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
?.
Raymond Phillip CABUTUTAN,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 900289
FILED: May 24, 1993
First District, Box Elder County
The Honorable Franklin L. Gunnel!
ATTORNEYS:
R. Paul Van Dam, Att'y Gen., Judith S. H
Atherton, Asst Att'y Gen , Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff
A W. Launtzen, Logan, for defendant

This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice:
Defendant Raymond Phillip Cabututan was
one of four defendants convicted of second
degree murder in the beating death of Miguel
Ramirez, m violation of Utah Code Ann
§76*5-203. He was also convicted of aggravated
assault, in violation of section 76-5-103, and of
a related misdemeanor. All four defendants were
convicted in separate trials, and all four
appealed Their appeals have been separately
considered, two by this court and two by the
court of appeals. See State v. Brown,
P 2d
(Utah 1992); State v. Cunvmns, 839 P.2d
848 (Utah Ct. App 1992), State v. Coyer, 814
P.2d 604 (Utah Ct. App 1991).
FACTS
The incident that resulted m the death of
Ramirez occurred on October 25, 1989, at a
small trailer camp commonly known as
"Fingerpoint.* The camp is located on a remote
site on the Great Salt Lake's northwest shore
The four trailers m the camp were owned by
Western Brine Shrimp Company, which
employed the four defendants and four other
workers who witnessed the beating. The evening
of the incident was a dark, cloudy, moonless
night; the only outside lights for miles around
the camp were the dim lights of the trailers. The
violence began sometime between 9 p.m. and
midnight as ^ H t u t a n and co-defendants
William Cummins, Donald Brown, and Billy
Cayer were sitting in one of the trailers drinking
alcohol. Eddie Apodaca, another worker at the
camp, came to the trader. Cabututan and
Apodaca began to argue, and Cabututan struck

7. Utah Code Ann §59-2-1001(2)
8. Utah Code Ann §59-2-301 states, "The county
assessor shall assess all property located within the
county which is not required by law to be assessed by
the commission "
». Utah Code Ann 159-2-302
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

Code*Co
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State v. Cabututan
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Apodaca with a wrench. Apodaca then returned January 22, just twenty days later, making it
to his trailer and told roommate Miguel Ramirez impossible for him to meet the thirty-day
requirement in the statute. However, the trial
what had happened.
Minutes later, Brown, Cummins, Caver, and court waived the thirty-day requirement, finding
Cabututan entered Apodaca and Ramirez's simply that "under the statute you haven't filed
trailer. More fighting occurred, knives were [the notice] timely." In other words, the trial
drawn, and Ramirez left the trailer. The three court ruled thai Cabututan did not give notice
co-defendants followed him outside. Cabututan "at the time of arraignment or as soon afterward
came out later. The fight escalated, and Brown, as possible." He gave notice on January 16,
Cummins, Cayer, and for at least part of the fourteen days after the arraignment. However,
time, Cabututan attacked Ramirez with fourteen days after the arraignment was six days
nunchakus, knives, and a wrench. They also before trial, wfajich the trial court concluded was
kicked him as he lay on the ground. At too late. The court was anxious to expedite the
approximately 5 a.m. the following day, he died four trials because all four defendants were
being held in custody and some of the witnesses
of multiple blunt trauma injury.
The four defendants were arraigned in the had left the state.
district court on January 2, 1990, and the next
We need not and do not here determine
day, separate trial dates were set. Cabututan's whether the trial court erred in denying
trial was scheduled to begin on January 22. On Cabututan's motions because the denials, if
January 16, six days before his trial, he filed a erroneous, were harmless. At the same time that
notice of intent 'to offer testimony of a mental Cabututan moved for the appointment of a
health expert to establish mental state" under psychiatrist, he also moved for the appointment
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-3. He also moved as an of a toxicologist "to determine the level of
indigent under section 77-32-1(3) and Utah Rule alcohol in [his] blood at the time of the alleged
of Evidence 706 for the appointment of a incident." That motion was granted, and a
psychiatrist and for a mental evaluation under toxicologic was appointed.
section 77-14-4, all in support of a voluntary
At the trial, Cabututan was able to testify only
intoxication defense he intended to raise. The generally as to how much he had to drink on the
court held that notice of intent to offer such fateful night. In answer to the question "How
expert testimony had not been timely filed and many drinks did you have?" Cabututan replied:
on that basis denied all the motions.
"I don't know. [ drank what's gone out of there
At trial, Cabututan contended that he did not (a partially empty bottle of Jack Daniels
participate in the prolonged beating of Ramirez. whiskey) except for maybe two glasses. . . .
Instead, he maintained that be hit Ramirez with You don't count how many glasses you drink,
a wrench in self-defense when Ramirez attacked you know." He also testified that he drank a can
him with a knife. Cabututan testified that he of "Old Milwaukee's Best" and a glass of
took the knife away from Ramirez and went vodka. He described his condition as "pretty
back to his trailer, where he had another drink loaded" but said that he was not staggering and
and then went to sleep. Cabututan raised the not like co-defendant Cayer, who he said was
defenses of self-defense and diminished capacity "just slobbering drunk" and "out of it."
based on voluntary intoxication. He testified that Cabututan further testified that he started
he was intoxicated, as did other eyewitnesses, drinking again the next morning, after he found
and a jury instruction on voluntary intoxication out that Ramirez was dead.
was given. Following his convictions, he moved
Following this testimony, Cabututan's counsel
for a new trial, but the court denied that motion. sought to have the toxicologic testify as to
Cabututan's level of intoxication. The prosecutor
objected on the ground that there was not a
APPOINTMENT OF A PSYCHIATRIST
Cabututan contends that the trud court erred in sufficient foundation for the toxicologic to
denying his motions because (1) the notice filed express an opinion. The court sustained the
on January 16 was timely, and (2) as an objection, observing that Cabututan drank before
indigent, he had a due process right to and after the altercations with Ramirez and
psychiatric assistance in preparing his voluntary resumed drinking the next morning. It further
intoxication defense, relying on Ake v. observed that tome of the whiskey gone from
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68,105 S. Ct. 1087, 84 L. the bottle was consumed by others. The court
Ed. 2d 53 (1985). Section 77-14-3(1) provides: ruled:
For the reauson I indicated, I don't think
When a defendant proposes to offer . . .
we can identify exactly how much he drank
testimony of a mental health expert to
or over what period of time, and the critical
establish mental state, he shall, at the time
thing would l>e the (amount] . . . prior to
of arraignment or as soon afterward as
die incident. And so I just think there's no
practicable, but not fewer than 30 days
foundation on which you can base it.
before his trial, file and serve the
Even though the toxicologist was not permitted
prosecuting attorney with written notice of
to give an opinion as to Cabututan's level of
his intention to claim the defense.
Cabututan argues that the notice was timely filed intoxication and how Cabututan would be
under the circumstances since he was arraigned affected by it, the trial court did give the
on January 2 and his trial was scheduled for following instruction to the jury on the defense
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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of voluntary intoxication:
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense
to a criminal charge unless such intoxication
negates the exigence of the mental state
which is an element of the offense;
however, if recklessness or criminal
negligence establishes an element of an
offense and the actor is unaware of the risk
because of voluntary intoxication, his
unawareness is immaterial in a prosecution
for that offense. It is the defendant's burden
to prove that this intoxication was so great
that he was incapable of forming the
necessary intent.
Cabututan has not raised as error on this
appeal the exclusion of the lexicologist's
testimony. However, we conclude that the
exclusion was proper because of the lack of a
sufficient foundation as to the amount of alcohol
Cabututan consumed prior to the beating of
Ramirez. A fortiori, if there was insufficient
foundation for a lexicologist to testify, there
would have been the same insufficiency facing
a psychiatrist in testifying as to the effect of
Cabututan's intoxication on his ability to form
the requisite intent for the crimes charged.
Therefore, assuming that defendant was entitled
to the appointment of a psychiatrist as he
maintains, the court's refusal to make that
appointment was harmless error.

Codc»Co
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JURY VIEW OF CRIME SCENE

Cabututan next contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for
an order permitting the jury to view the scene of
the crime pursuant to rule 17(i) of the Utah
Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule states,
"When in the opinion of the court it is proper
for the jury to view the place in which the
offense is alleged to have been committed . . .
it may order them to be conducted in a body
under the charge of an officer to the place." The
crime occurred near midnight, and the only
lighting was from dim trailer lights. The only
eyewitness who stated that Cabututan was
involved in the major part of the fight was
Richard Anderson, and his testimony was
inconsistent with his prior statements and those
of other eyewitnesses. As a result, Cabututan
argues, if the jurors could have viewed the
scene, they would have found (1) that
Anderson's line of sight was obstructed by door
frames and vehicles, and (2) that due to the dun
light, it would have been difficult for him to see
who was involved in the beating that took place
outside the trailer.
In denying the motion, the trial court based its
decision, inter alia, on two factors: (1) the lack
of "assurance that the conditions which now
exist at the site are the same presently as at the
time of the alleged incident/ and (2) "the
availability of photographs which have
previously been taken, diagrams of the area as
PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR
Cabututan*! second assignment of error is that well as maps and other exhibits and also the
the trial court abused its discretion in not testimony of the witnesses as to the incident in
entering an order for the appointment of a question." The genera] rule as to granting or
private investigator pursuant to section denying an order to view the premises states:
77-32-1(3) until five days before trial and that
A decision to order a viewing is within the
this delay caused his attorney to be ineffective.
discretion of the trial court. . . . A view
There are two problems with this argument.
should not be granted unless it appears to be
First, the belated appointment of the private
reasonably certain or the court is satisfied
investigator was caused by the motion's being
that it will be of some aid to the jury in
filed in the wrong court; it was filed in the
reaching its verdict and it is distinctly
circuit court instead of the district court.
impracticable and inefficient to present the
Cabututan's attorney filed the motion on
materia] elements to them by photographs,
November 1. In a November 3 order, the circuit
diagrams, maps, measurements, and the
court declined to order the appointment of an
like. There is a presumption as to the
investigator because "(tjhe required procedure
correctness of the trial ji}dgt'$ ruling in the
has not been complied with." Therefore,
absence of a demonstration to the contrary,
Cabututan's attorney was aware two days after
and that decision will not be upset absent a
filing the motion that it was denied on the basis
clear abuse of discretion.
of procedural considerations. There i$ no 75 Am. JUT. 2d Trial {259 (1991); see also
evidence in the record or reference in the briefs McCormick on Evidence ch. 21, §216 (John W.
to when the second motion, which resulted in Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); State v. Roedl, 107
the appointment five days before trial, was filed Utah 538, 155 P.2d 741 (1945). In fact, it has
in the district court.
been held that a court abuses its discretion if it
Second, even though the appointment was permits the jury to view the scene if the
belated, Cabututan'i attorney had the assistance conditions have changed. See, e.g., People v.
of the private investigator prior to November 7, McQatfy, 86 A.D.2d 493, 495-96, 450
thirteen days after the crime occurred. Tim N.Y.S.2d 507, 509 (App. Div. 1982) (abuse of
Francis, the investigator, testified at trial that he discretion to see scene because of change in
visited the scene of the crime on November 7. conditions); Grand Truck Western R.R. v.
Defense counsel acknowledged in his closing FunUy, 530 N.E.2d 139 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988)
arguments at trial that Francis had been at the (new trial granted because there was no proof
scene of the crime "two or three weeks" after that variable of accident, such as weather
the murder. We therefore find no error in the conditions and placement of bodies,
belated appointment.
approximated that of actual incident).
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We find no abuse of discretion in the trial
court's denial of the motion to view the scene.
At the time the motion was made, the site of the
crime was being used by an operating business
enterprise* It u therefore unlikely that the nte
would have been in the same condition in
January as it had been in October, three months
earlier. In addition, the trial court determined
that photographs, diagrams, and maps were
available which were sufficient to explain to the
jury the physical layout of the crime scene. See
State v. Qxyer, 814 P.2d at 613, where the court
of appeals found no abuse of discretion by the
trial court in refusing to allow the jury hearing
co-defendant Cayer's case to view the crime
scene.
JURY DELIBERATION
On the last day of trial, the court dismissed
the jury sometime during the morning hours "to
return home or whatever" until 1 p.m. During
this recess, the court and counsel prepared the
jury instructions. When the jurors returned, the
court instructed them, and counsel for both sides
presented closing arguments. The record does
not disclose when the jury was dismissed to
begin deliberations but only that the verdict was
returned at 8:50 p.m. that same day.
Cabututan argues that because the jury had
listened to four days of testimony, it could not
have reviewed all of the testimony and evidence
in just three hours. Thus, the jurors must have
actually begun deliberations during the morning
hours when many of them remained in the jury
room waiting for court to convene at 1 p.m.
There is no support in the record for
defendant's assertions. When the jury was
dismissed in the morning, the jurors were
admonished not to discuss the case until it was
submitted to them. We have nothing before us to
confirm that any of the jurors remained in the
jury room, let alone began discussing the case.
We do not presume error; the burden is on
defendant to demonstrate it, which he has not
done.
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Cabututan complains of several incidents of
prosecutorial misconduct. He asserts that
Richard Anderson, the State's key witness,
perjured himself and that die prosecution's use
of his testimony violated die due process
guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. He
also charges that the prosecutor commented in a
disparaging way in elosing arguments about
Cabututan's self-defense claims and that the
prosecutor vouched for Anderson's credibility.
However, Cabututan made no objections to any
of this alleged misconduct at the time it
occurred. Unless such objections are timely
made, we do not consider them on appeal. "[I]t
is the rule that if improper statements are made
by counsel during a trial, it is the duty of
opposing counsel to register a contemporaneous
objection thereto so that the court may make a
correction by proper instruction and, if the
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offense is sufficiently prejudicial, declare a
mistrial." State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 561
(Utah 1987).
DENIAL OF CONTINUANCE
rflKiftm^p contends that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for a continuance. The
standard of review for the denial of a motion for
continuance u abuse of discretion: "It is
well-established that the granting of a
continuance is discretionary with the trial judge.
Absent a clear abuse of that discretion, the
decision will not be reversed by this Court."
State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah
1985). Cabututan argues that when the
continuance was not granted, he did not have
sufficient: time to prepare his defense. The court
appointed counsel for Cabututan on October 31,
1989, six days after the crime occurred. Counsel
had more than two and one-half months to
prepare for trial. On January 10, Cabututan
moved for a continuance. In its denial the
following day, die trial court indicated that it
was concerned that any further delay would
lessen die chance that all witnesses could be
present for the trial. This concern was
well-founded. One of the witnesses was never
found, and another had left the state but was
found in Nevada prior to trial. Considering the
circumstances in this case, we find no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's denying the
continuance.
Cabututan also argues that the denial of the
continuance rendered his counsel ineffective
because he had insufficient time to prepare a
defense. Denying a continuance may result in
the violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. In interpreting the standard set
out in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), we
stated dtat when claiming ineffective assistance
of counsel, the defendant has the burden of
demonstrating (I) that counsers representation
falls below an "objective standard of
reasonableness* and (2) that any deficiency is
prejudicial to the defendant. Suae v. Frame, 723
P.2d 401,405 (Utah 1986). Although Cabututan
charges several instances of conduct by his
attorney which fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness, he fails to show how these
alleged deficiencies were prejudicial to him. As
a result, we find no violation of Cabututan's
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel.

DENLtL OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
Cabututan next contends that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for a
new trial that he made on the ground of newly
discovered evidence. He asserts that the
testimony his three co-defendants gave at their
subsequently held trials exculpates him and
supports his claim of self-defense. The
co-defendants refused to testify at Cabututan *s
trial, invoking the protection of the Fifth
Amendment. He argues that if a new trial is
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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granted him and the co-defendants again refuse
to testify, a transcnpt of their testimony at their
trials could be relied on
At the tune of the hearing on Cabututan's
motion for a new trial, transcripts of the other
trials were being prepared but were not yet
available. In arguing the motion, Cabututan's
counsel could only generally refer to the
testimony of the co-defendants. Counsel
attempted to show that their testimony
corroborated Cabututan's testimony at his own
trial that he had acted in self-defense.
We conclude that the tnal court was unable to
fairly determine the merits of the motion for a
new tnal without the availability of the
transcnpts of the other trials. They are now
available. We therefore reverse the order
denying a new trial and remand the case to the
tnal court to conduct anew the hearing on the
motion for a new tnal
PREJUDICE
We decline to consider defendant's assertions
of prejudice on the part of the jury, the court,
and the justice system because he failed to
provide a legal analysis of these issues
Affirmed in part and reversed and remanded
in part.
WE CONCUR:
Gordon R. Hall, Chief Justice
1. Daniel Stewart, Justice
Christine M Durham, Justice
Michael D Zimmerman, Justice
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RUSSON, Associate Presiding Judge:
Dr. Wallace Morgan appeals the tnal court s
amended decree of divorce, challenging the
court's valuation and distribution of the parties'
property and the award of alimony and attorney
fees to Vera Morgan. We affirm.
FACTS
The Morgans were married June 29, 1950 In
June 1986, Mrs. Morgan filed a complaint for
separate maintenance. In response, Dr. Morgan
filed an answer and counterclaim seeking a
decree of divorce. On May 26, 1988, the tnal
court entered a decree of divorce that (1)
effected an extensive property distribution
between the parties, (2) awarded Mrs. Morgan
alimony in the amount of $2,000 per month for
two years from the date of the entry of the
decree, at which time alimony would decrease to
$1,700 per month, and (3) awarded Mrs
Morgan attorney ftts and costs in the amount of
$75,000.
Dr. Morgan appealed the trial court's decree
to this court, challenging the trial court's
valuation and distribution of the couple's
property and claiming that the tnal court erred
in swarding alimony, attorney fees and costs to
Mrs. Morgan. In that appeal, this court reversed
the trial court's award of certain costs to Mrs
Morgan and remanded the remaining issues to
the trial court for additional and more detailed
findings See Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684,
692 (Utah App. 1990).
On remand, following a hearing, the tnal
court entered its amended findings of fact,
conclusions of law and decree dividing the
property between the parties, awarding alimony
to Mrs. Morgan in the amount of $2,000 per
month for two years from the date of entry of
the decree and $1,700 per month thereafter, and
awarding her attorney fees m the amount of
$67,567.35.'
Dr. Morgan appeals, claiming that the tnal
court erred m: (1) entering findings of fact and
conclusions of law that do not accurately reflect
the court's minute entry; (2) valuing and
distnbutmg the parties' property; (3) awarding
alimony to Mrs. Morgan; and (4) awarding
attorney fees to Mrs. Morgan.

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Dr. Morgan argues that the tnal court erred in
Third District, Salt Lake County
entering sis amended findings of fact,
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat
conclusions of law and decree because they are
inconsistent with the court's written minute entry
ATTORNEYS:
as to the distribution of the parties' stocks.
Bert L. Dart and Kent L. Kasting, Salt Lake
Specifically, he asserts that pursuant to the trial
City, for Appellant
court's minute entry, he was awarded one
Dennis C. Ferguson, Salt Lake City, for
hundred percent of the parties' stock, not
Appellee
seventy-five percent as reflected in the amended
findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree2
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Russon.
Mrs. Morgan responds that Dr. Morgan's claim
ts moot because die tnal court, m a subsequent
This opinion is subject to revision before
older
and judgment, ordered Dr. Morgan to
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
transfer twenty-five percent of the parties' stock
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